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ABSTRACT 
This study interprets the political, strategic, and institutional durability of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the diplomatic revolutions of the past twenty 
years.   In particular, the study seeks to understand the characteristics of statecraft, policy, 
strategy, and institutional custom and tradition that have allowed NATO as an 
organization and as a group of democracies to cope with the changes in the international 
system and the stresses and strains of domestic politics and burden-sharing in the inner 
workings of the alliance, its allies and partners. This study traces the process of 
transformation and evolution that NATO has endured by analyzing its institutional 
characteristics, the moral imperatives that guide its actions, and the level of involvement 
its major players contribute through a comparative case study encompassing such modern 
operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF) in the years since end of the 
1990s until present. 
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I. THE VALUE OF NATO 
NATO, over the course of more than six decades, has become a cornerstone of 
international security for the western democracies as well as the world system of states 
and stability thanks to its particular embodiment of statecraft, policy, security and 
strategy. The quest to create an entity that ensures security and stability and promotes 
democracy and its notion of the free market economy started after the Great War in the 
early twentieth century. Without the existence of NATO beyond the year 1991, security 
agreements would have become untenable and unenforceable covenants1 in the trans-
Atlantic community. Ian Q. R. Thomas deems NATO the “defender of peace,”2 the 
security enforcer essential in the volatile realm of international relations. 
This study interprets the political, strategic, and institutional durability of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the diplomatic revolutions of the past 
twenty years. In particular, the study seeks to understand the characteristics of statecraft, 
policy, strategy, and institutional custom and tradition that have allowed NATO as an 
organization and as a group of democracies to cope with the changes in the international 
system and the stresses and strains of domestic politics and burden-sharing in the inner 
workings of the alliance, its allies and partners. This study traces the process of 
transformation and evolution that NATO has endured by analyzing its institutional 
characteristics, the moral imperatives that guide its actions, and the level of involvement 
its major players contribute through a comparative case study encompassing such modern 
operations as Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF) in the years since end of the 
1990s until the present. 
                                                 
1  Thomas Hobbes, “The State of Nature and the State of War,” in Conflict After the Cold War: 
Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York, NY: Pearson Education, 2003), 
69. 
2  Ian R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 174.  
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A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS 
The origins of this process are to be found in the strategic system of the Paris 
suburban treaties and the League of Nations of the interwar year, a story that is vital for a 
comprehension of NATO as a force in war and peace. The Covenant of the League 
provided for collective security, but the victorious allies failed to keep the peace with 
sound statecraft in the 1920s, in which they placed too great a faith in good will, as well 
as institutions without teeth. The latter was made worse by the failure of the United States 
to play its role in the European system in a sound way.  
By 1936, France, which had the lonely task of monitoring and remediating any 
violations of the Versailles Settlement (left in the lurch by the U.S. and the British in the 
1920s and then outmaneuvered by the Germans in the 1930s with the link to Poland in 
1934), dealt with the most tangible risk in the formerly French-occupied Rhineland and 
the “dissolved”3 alliance (collapsing into individual, national “isolationism”4). Dr. Colin 
S. Gray, European Director of the National Institute of Public Policy,5 summarizes: 
None of France’s former great power allies were willing or able to play an 
active role in supporting the European order which they had helped 
establish at Versailles. Russia was a pariah state, distrusted and self-
absorbed, though willing to collaborate secretly with Weimar Germany on 
innovative military projects for mutual advantage. The United States had 
rejected the League of Nations because of the theoretical obligation to take 
action for collective security which membership entailed... Last, but not 
least, Britain was more worried about French hegemony in Europe than it 
was sympathetic to French security anxieties, so it, too, was not available 
as an ally, even as an unreliable one. That political condition was to 
endure until early 1939.6 
                                                 
3 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 105. 
Gray writes, “The Alliance, plus its American co-belligerent, that had won dissolved almost as rapidly as 
did the armies of its offshore members, Britain and the United States.” 
4  Ian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 117.  
5  National Institute for Public Policy, “Dr. Colin S. Gray,” 2009, 
http://www.nipp.org/Professional/Bio’s/grayc.html (accessed February 23, 2012).  NIPP state, “Dr. Gray is 
a member of the editorial boards Orbis, Comparative Strategy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Strategique, 
and Naval War College Review. He has served on advisory panels for the Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment (SDI and weapons), the Department of the Army (tactical nuclear weapons), the 
Department of the Air Force (innovations), and U.S. Space Command (future of space forces).” 
6  Gray, War, Peace and International Relations, 108.  
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The lack of a common security accord, and the recently acquired cultural aversion 
to war, added pressure to the weakened global-strategic environment, exacerbated by the 
global economic status of the 1930s.  
The economic despair left in the wake of the Great Depression provided Adolf 
Hitler the opening to harness national suffering and employ it in a highly-politicized 
manner through the mobilization of Germany’s nationalistic fervor. The global political 
context of the 1930s, influenced by a sentiment of war-aversion and national 
individualistic policies, produced the strategic opportunity that Nazi Germany required to 
exercise its militant expansionist policy, in direct violation of the Versailles Settlement. 
Germany’s “revisionist”7 government took advantage of and eventually transgressed the 
unenforceable agreements, leading the global powers into World War II. 
Dr. Gray, explains:  “Every international order requires, though does not always 
enjoy, the service of an effective policing agent or guardian.”8  The interwar structures of 
interstate relations in and around Europe provided no such guarantor of the democratic 
order or, as Thomas Hobbes notes in conjunction with justice and the constitution of 
commonwealth, the maintenance of covenants and agreements enforceable by a civil 
power.9  The embodiment of a civil power that effectively guards the peace lies within 
the arsenal of values that rests at the core of NATO. The trans-Atlantic alliance’s security 
would no longer be threatened by the lack of a peace enforcement entity. With its 
creation in 1949, NATO’s actions would be characterized with legitimacy through 
multinational efforts to maintain stability and security, while promoting democracy and 
peace. 
To date, maintaining the vital national interests of its member nations, whether in 
close geographical proximity or through out-of-area operations, the Alliance’s decisions 
and actions have in a process over the decades enabled consultation and consensus prior 
to mobilization of statecraft or force. NATO’s assets and methods have proven multi-
                                                 
7  Gray, War, Peace and International Relations, 108. 
8  Ibid., 106.  
9  Hobbes, “The State of Nature and the State of War,” in Conflict After the Cold War, 69. 
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functional over the years, employing not only military force, but also culturally adept 
personnel that provide due attention to politics, economy, and social structures and 
dynamics. The organization’s receptiveness to its members’ cultural sensitivities, 
strategic and political cultures, along with its adaptive features provide it room to grow 
and evolve to meet its current and future challenges.   
B. THE ALLIANCE’S MORAL IMPERATIVE AND RELEVANCE 
This historical study brings to light the mechanisms the Alliance has employed to 
maintain legitimacy and relevance. By reviewing NATO’s past challenges, discerning its 
valuable practices underscoring the moral imperatives with which it acts, the research 
shows the factors that contribute to its global legitimacy. This study also highlights the 
organization’s attributes and characteristics that feed its vitality in order to add to this 
subject’s academic body of work. 
 1. Values, Legitimacy and a Higher Moral Ground Based on Western 
Norms  
The moral responsibility to protect NATO’s member nations is no longer a matter 
exclusively or even mostly of infringement of borders during an aggressive military 
invasion. Threats of uncompromising ideology10 that spur terrorism and irregular warfare 
require deterrent strategies from a civil power that resorts to proactive and preventive 
measures to promote stability and security. These measures require the organization to 
provide economic, political, or military aid (or a combination) by establishing a presence 
inside the confines of another sovereign nation-state—while walking the fine line that 
distinguishes NATO as a force for good versus an imperialistic vehicle for Western 
ideals. 
                                                 
10  Gray, War, Peace and International Relations, 260.  Gray writes:  “The problem is that those goals 
happen to be wildly unreasonable in the view of other cultures. It is true to claim that its objectives are so 
radical as to be non-negotiable, but it is incorrect to argue that it has no real political agenda. Led by the 
charismatic Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda demands the removal of allegedly apostate Islamic regimes; the 
restoration of the Caliphate as the source of supreme Islamic authority over the whole of the Dar ul Islam 
[...] and the elimination of Western non-, even anti-Islamic influence and practices from the Middle East...  
[T]he movement’s ideologically driven agenda is not of a kind that lends itself to a process of give and 
take. Unlike Irish or Palestinian terrorist organizations, al Qaeda, claiming religions sanction for its 
absolute demands, cannot be bribed to the conference table and offered some fraction of its demands.” 
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There exists a series of conditions in which NATO might take action, while the 
decision to take action must rest on widely acceptable norms and beliefs. The conditions 
for action are delineated by the Articles of the Washington Treaty;11 however, the widely 
accepted norms rely on Western ideals and influences promoted by the Alliance. This 
study shows how the Western ideals promoted by NATO, which clearly states its 
Western foundations in its charter, have a historical precedent, and moreover, shape each 
member nation’s individual, yet collectively congruent, moral imperative. These 
examples are explicated through analysis of NATO’s championing of a higher moral 
ground founded on Western ideals, its partnership with the United Nations and their goal 
to promote and safeguard human rights, and the case study of German, U.S., and French 
involvement in contemporary conflicts. 
2. Expressing Relevance:  Utility of NATO and its Policy, Security and 
Strategy 
A comparative assessment that contrasts security and stability situations before 
and after security operations that presents the social and political effects of NATO forces’ 
presence may prove instrumental to show the organization’s effectiveness. The trans-
Atlantic requirement for collective defense, and therefore the requirement and utility of 
NATO, may seem reactionary. Given its creation after World War II, the requirement for 
a security partnership proved instrumental for the resurgence of economic power and 
defense in post-war Europe. As this study historically presents, by comparing the effects 
of the Alliance’s intervention, its roles as defender of the peace and promoter of Western 
ideals will qualify NATO’s worth and relevance. In addition, and in order to dispel this 
seemingly reactionary characteristic, a look into the Alliance’s developments will provide 
proof of the organization’s evolving preventive character through social, military, and 
economic capabilities. By presenting a review of the global community’s reliance and 
benefits derived from NATO as a provider of peace, as a political forum, and as a catalyst 
for proper function of the United Nations,12 this study overcomes this issue. 
                                                 
11  Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action 
after the Cold War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 153–157.  
12  Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, 48. NATO has enforced numerours UN Security Council 
Resolutions.  
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C. THE CRISES OF NATO 
Various studies have rigorously researched NATO’s historical precedents in order 
to define the Alliance’s attributes and characteristics. Analyses of NATO’s leadership, 
organizational structure and integrity, missions, to specifically point out the temporal, if 
changing role it had throughout history. This research investigates how the Alliance 
approached, dealt with, and eventually overcame the various political, economic, and 
even conceptual obstacles. To better serve the reader, this study defines overarching 
terms, concepts, and proposes a didactic position from which to view NATO’s past, 
present, and future. 
NATO, since its creation, has faced challenges that have cast its endurance at the 
forefront of global-strategic proceedings. This typecasting of challenges as crises, which 
the organization must overcome in order to survive, take on an adversarial quality which 
makes each of them a threat to the Alliance’s utility, prestige, and even its existence (by 
some accounts). However, a broader point of view for organizational behavior certainly 
downplays the significance of NATO’s challenges and characterizes these as checkpoints 
in a steady transformative trajectory. Depending on which school of thought one ascribes 
to, the friction-laden obstacles the Alliance has faced give it either a revolutionary 
character, or evolutionary grit. The following review presents a historical crisis analysis 
by referencing the crises’ proponents’ characterizations, culminating in my proposed 
viewpoint using Samuel P. Huntington’s variables of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, 
and coherence in an organization’s institutionalization.13 
The crises, which characterized a facet of NATO’s lifespan at the time of 
occurrence, largely depended on the contextual strategic background and the 
organization’s history.   A problematic conception, a bureaucratic crisis, breaches of the 
alliance, and identity crisis at the end of Cold War represent examples of external and 
internal obstacles that threatened the Alliance’s justification of being. After the crisis of 
creation, NATO faced the challenge of asset management, notwithstanding the political 
friction that came with the concept of collective defense:  a bureaucratic crisis. The initial 
                                                 
13  Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), 12.  
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phase of the nuclear arms race through the 1950s represents the bureaucratic friction, 
political bargaining, and burden-sharing14 that characterizes one of NATO’s most notable 
crises. NATO’s dilemma of containment and nuclear weapon plan execution primed the 
stage for the organization’s bureaucratic crisis due to asset management and load bearing 
within collective defense. 
In the mid-1950s, the Suez Canal crisis presented NATO with a challenge that 
degraded the prestige and credibility of the organization:  an internal breach of the 
alliance.   Britain and France took bilateral action to secure individualistic national 
interests in Egypt, degrading the legitimacy and credibility of the Alliance by acting 
without engaging in proper means of consultation. The subversive nationalistic actions 
performed by NATO member states, in direct contradiction of the organization’s 
foundational agreements, received self-corrective attention from the North Atlantic 
Council,15 and reformulated its mission objectives to enhance and enforce means of 
consultation, which would become the defining characteristic of NATO. The refinement 
of objectives marked a coming of age in the organization’s existence that prepared the 
Alliance for on of its most formidable crises:  identity crisis at the end of the Cold War. 
Without its ideological enemy to systematically spread communism, what mission would 
define the alliance?   
Alexandra Gheciu argues that the role of NATO does not confine itself to 
international security, but rather concerns itself with the promotion of “… liberal 
democratic norms and participate[s] in the construction of new laws and institutions in 
ex-Communist states... [in its pursuit of] security and stability in post-Cold War 
Europe.”16  This assertion by Gheciu implies a different approach to address international 
                                                 
14  Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 2003).  
15  Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, 56.  Thomas explains:  “British and French action, undertaken in 
collusion with Israel, and accompanied by attempts to mislead rather than consult their NATO allies, 
casused a major temporary breach in the alliance, which soon needed urgently to be repaired... The 
allicance was quickly patched up at a meeting of the NAC in December 1956, only three weeks after the 
fighting ended, when useful texts to express the newly restored unity and pont the way forward were 
conveniently found in the Report of the Committee of Three on Nonmilitary Cooperation.”  
16  Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe”: The Politics of International Socialization After 
the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 4.  
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security:  dissemination of “liberal norms and rules of international behavior, in particular 
involving peaceful settlement of dispute, multilateralism, and democracy and human 
rights promotion in the international arena.”17  Gheciu further explains that NATO 
focuses on state-craft through the “inside”18 approach, promoted by international 
relations theorist Immanuel Kant, in which “the construction and protection of domestic 
institutions regarded as progressive and peace generating”19 were harnessed by NATO to 
promote “Western-defined norms in the area of security.”20 
In essence, the Alliance centered on what it stood for (Western ideals of 
democracy and economy), and evolved out of the constraints of being defined by its 
opposition. “Formed to defend the peace, NATO as the Cold War ended tried to 
transform itself into an organization committed to promoting the peace....  [A] dynamic 
conception:”21  NATO enhanced its survival in the geo-political arena, and succeeded its 
crisis of identity. 
Through the organizational perspective of Samuel P. Huntington, I argue that the 
crises the Alliance has endured have not single-handedly defined the organization. The 
crises formed an evolutionary track that fomented organizational characteristics that have 
led to its institutionalization. As the following analysis proves apparent through historical 
and conceptual examples, NATO’s degree of institutionalization, along with the 
characteristics that define it as such, allows the organization to transcend periods of 
economic strife, political discord, and military action and in-action. As a geo-strategic 
institution, the flexibility promoted by its civilian and military resource structure makes it 
more than a military alliance.   Its role spreading democratic ideals, and creating security 
out of instability and threats through diplomatic and military means when warranted, 
increase its relevance and intrinsic value. 
                                                 
17  Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe,” 11.  
18  Ibid., 8.  
19  Ibid., 9.  
20  Ibid., 10.  
21  Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, 174.  
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D. ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY 
This study comprises a historical review of NATO’s six decades of existence, 
with particular emphasis on post-Cold War operations as well as its adjustment to the 
cosmos of war and peace since 1989. In addition to the historical recount of NATO’s 
performance, policy-making, and operating procedures, this study reveals the 
organization’s resilience through comparative military strategy, review of ethical 
standpoints, and an analysis of current NATO policies. 
E. STUDY OVERVIEW 
This study examines the NATO’s adaptive nature, the propagation of Western 
ideals through a historical review of its operations and its ethical resolve when faced with 
terrorism and illegitimate governments; and in conclusion, present the transformative 
edge that will maintain its legitimacy and relevance in the future. The first chapter of 
research focuses on the historical actions of NATO to adequately categorize political 
decisions, military action, or diplomatic maneuvers with institutional characteristics from 
the Huntington model of institutionalization. Following the historical review that 
compiles the Alliance’s institutional characteristics, an analysis of moral imperatives that 
guides its projection of Western ideals frames the ethical context of contemporary 
operations. This study engages an in-depth review of ethical and social responsibility of 
the Alliance when faced with a “fourth generation war,”22 and the steps taken to maintain 
legitimacy. Lastly, the conclusion highlights the establishment and maintenance of 
relevance that NATO possesses through a look at modern Alliance policy and future 
security endeavors. This study addresses the transformation23 process within NATO and 
the actions taken by Allied Command Transformation as it looks to confront future 
challenges. 
                                                 
22  Scott Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach,” in Transforming Defense Capabilities: New 
Approaches for International Security (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2009), 12.  Jasper 
contends, “Fourth generation warfare uses primarily asymmetric methods to achieve political 
outcomes…” 
23  Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach,” in Transforming Defense Capabilities, 3.  
“Transformation is defined as a continuous process that shapes the nature of military competition and 
cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, streamlined organizational structures, 
innovative processes, and adaptive personnel developments that exploit national advantages and protect 
against asymmetric vulnerabilities. By definition, transformation has no end state.”  
 10
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II. OVERCOMING CRISES 
A. TYPOLOGY OF CRISES 
NATO’s crises have received global notoriety due the magnitude of the 
organization’s effects on the world stage in the past sixty-plus years of war and peace. 
Since its inception in 1949, NATO has persisted in an evolving global-strategic 
environment that encompasses ideological, technological, economical, and cultural 
changes but poorly anticipated by the alliance’s many critics over the years that endlessly 
predict the death of NATO. Friction created by diverging national strategies, un-common 
goals, and inflexible guidelines presented NATO with obstacles to gain legitimacy and 
relevance. The crises, in my view, are requirements in the “institutionalization” of the 
organization imposed by external and internal factors throughout its history. Each 
individual challenge presented the Alliance with a defining obstacle that highlighted the 
organization’s deficits in policy and practices. 
B. A CHALLENGING HISTORY 
As an institution of collective defense and then security and peace, NATO’s 
creation represented a continuation of recovery treaties that advocated economic alliance 
and collective defense in the years after 1945. A failed history of defense agreements and 
prior world disillusionment of liberal and capitalist ideals represented obstacles for the 
insecurity and anxiety that Europe encountered in 1945. The League of Nations, a 
collective security system predecessor, cast by its critics as well as by the record of 1919–
1938 as unreliable, impotent, and partial due to its mal-conceived and ill-enforced 
legislatures and sanctions a decade earlier.24 After World War II, in the midst of 
reconstructive effort for the global international structure, the establishment of the United 
                                                 
24  Bernard Wasserstein, Barbarism & Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 249.  Wasserstein writes:  “Two precedents had already been set for the failure of 
collective security under the League. The first was the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 which 
had earned the invader a rap over the knuckles but little more from the League-appointed Lytton 
Commission in 1932. The second was the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935... After the invasion, 
the League gingerly rebuked Italy and eventually imposed limited an ineffective economic sanctions 
against her... Liberal opinion in Britain condemned the Italians but Mussolini successfully defied his critics 
and exposed the League as impotent.”  
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Nations in June of 1945 ascertained the requirement for an international forum, despite 
the demise of the League. The Soviet Union, entrenched in communist ideology, 
remained concerned with British and American pre-dominance. The British and 
Americans became wary of Soviet military capabilities and their ability to employ their 
arsenal in Eastern Europe. 
1. The Economic Dimension of Crisis as a Problem of Security 
The Great Depression, the worst possible economic state the world envisioned, 
“illustrated the inefficacy of international economic cooperation,”25 according to Bernard 
Wasserstein. The economic insecurity and nebulous future Western Europe faced 
required the aid and guidance of the United States. Wasserstein further explains: 
Europe in the late 1945 was a continent crippled, impoverished, and 
exhausted. All the economies of the belligerents in the final phase of the 
war had been geared to military production at the expense of civilian 
consumption. Destruction of infrastructure and wearing-out of machinery 
had greatly reduced productive capacity... The relative position of Europe 
in the world economy had shrunk. The United States now produced more 
than half of the world’s industrial output. Pre-war tariff barriers and 
wartime blockade had throttled international trade and abolished Europe’s 
central role in it. As European currencies tottered, the dollar reigned 
supreme. The United States had assumed Britain’s pre-1914 position as 
the world’s financial centre. Any revival of the European economies 
would inevitably depend on infusions of American capital and resumption 
of trade with the United States.26 
 
According to Ian Thomas, “Early conceptions about providing for the security of 
Europe rested on the assumptions about the centrality of economic recovery, which 
would restore confidence and generate prosperity.”27  The United States, as a creditor for 
the world and managing the world’s reserve currency in the dollar, became the 
cornerstone of European economies in peril. While British armed forces were 
overstretched throughout Europe, Palestine, and the Balkans and unable to respond to a 
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growing communist movement in Greece, the Greek government appealed to the United 
States in 1947.28  President Truman acquiesced, “promising U.S. economic and military 
support for ‘free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or 
by outside pressures’ [according to the President’s message to Congress].”29  June 1947 
saw Secretary of State George C. Marshall set forth the basic principles for the United 
State’s involvement in the economic recovery of Europe in a speech at Harvard 
University: 
It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to 
assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which 
there can be no political stability and no assured peace.  [The purpose of 
U.S. policy] should be the revival of a working economy in the world so  
as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which 
these institutions can exist.30 
The Marshall Plan effectively implemented in the Economic Cooperation Act of 
1948, disbursing $13 million31 from 1948 to 1952 across Western Europe.32  The first 
beneficiary of the economic aid and military guidance was Greece, whom by 1949 had 
“crushed” the Greek Communists’ “Democratic” Army.33  Thomas writes, “Despite 
Marshall’s generous offer of U.S. aid and the sweeping commitments implied by 
President Harry Truman’s plan, the Truman Doctrine, to provide military assistance to 
Greece, it was widely hoped that the real initiative to revitalize Europe would come from 
the European’s themselves.”34 
Britain and France renewed their collective security through the Treaty of 
Dunkirk in March 1947, leaning towards France’s fear of German militarism and 
rearmament. In March 1948, France and Britain, with the leadership of British Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin, joined the Benelux countries in the Treaty of Brussels “aimed 
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principally at preventing renewed German militarism in Europe, though it looked toward 
defending against the possibility of aggression from the Soviet Union.”35 
2. The Role of the U.S. Senate in Crisis Management 
The Vandenberg Resolution insured that a bureaucratic process remained intact in 
case a response to international aggression upon the signees of the Brussels Treaty. On 
June 1948, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg’s resolution maintained two key 
principles. The first insured that “in any security treaty signed by the United States there 
would be no automatic commitment to go to war—Congress, in keeping with its 
constitutionally mandated powers, would reserve the right to declare war[;]” and the 
second made sure “no unilateral benefits would accrue to the other parties to the treaty; 
security should flow both ways.”36  George F. Kennan, political adviser, diplomat and 
director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, argued that the economic 
forefront of American-European relations should receive the highest priority in order to 
address vulnerabilities “to totalitarian exploitation of all kinds, fascist and Nazi as well as 
communist.”37  However, his long telegram addressed Soviet socio-cultural and political 
intricacies based on communist ideology, and the potential detrimental impact communist 
doctrine might impose. Kennan summarizes: 
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the 
belief that with U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is 
desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be 
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international 
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This 
political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of 
world’s greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest national territory, 
and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. 
In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its 
influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and 
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versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground 
methods are presumably without parallel in history. 38   
Kennan’s views, although advocating economic reform to promote stability, did 
not disregard the requirement for a strong military posture in Europe. According the 
Thomas, Kennan believed that if “… a valid long-term justification for a formal defense 
relationship by international agreement, which could promote security in the North 
Atlantic area, it would have to be base on the assumption that a treaty would help develop 
defensive power in the area, act as a deterrent, and thus serve the goal of containment.”39 
C. A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY 
In the aftermath of World War II, Western Europe faced the insurmountable 
obstacle of overcoming the effects of a non-existent economy, a crippled infrastructure, 
and thus faced a monumental vulnerability to ideological and military invasion. Soviet 
influence, initiated by the physical enlargement of the USSR after the 1945 Potsdam 
meeting between diplomats from the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union,40 was 
solidified by the “… presence of the Soviet Army,” in eastern Europe.41 Communism 
spread throughout eastern European countries and internalized a repressive doctrine 
through subversive, coercive, and violent means,42 representative of the implementation 
of collectivism in mid-1930s Russia.43 
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1. The Anti-democratic Reach of Communist Coercion 
The Communist parties began to take over Central and Eastern European 
countries, with direction and support from Moscow. Bulgaria endured a “purge of non-
Communists from the army, police, judiciary, schools, civil service, and trade unions,” 
followed by the unwarranted arrest, trial, and execution of opposition movement party 
members in 1945.44  Hungary’s Prime Minister, Ferenc Nagy, a non-Communist party 
member, was subject to strong-arm tactics from the national Communist party who 
kidnapped his son, whose release would be secured through his exile in 1947. Non-
communist party members were similarly neutralized, or eliminated.45 Communist 
infiltration and coercion of the Romanian government was subjected to non-Communist 
party exclusion, falsification of parliamentary election results in 1946, and the forced 
abdication of the king in 1947.46 A one-party state was effected by the Communist 
movements in Poland and Czechoslovakia by 1948, through repressive tactics of   
“censorship, and intimidation.”47 The Communist movement, centered in Moscow, 
formed the failed Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947, 
“designed to coordinate and confirm the Soviet party’s hegemonic control over the 
international Communist movement.”48 Stalin implemented the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon), as an alternative to the Marshall Plan, and to “bind his 
east European clients to him.”49 
The threat significantly increased on August 29, 1949, in Semipalatinsk, 
Kazakhstan, with the Soviets’ atomic test, “First Lightning.”50  Soviet nuclear success 
can be attributed to espionage in Britain and the United States; personnel who “acted out 
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of ideological rather than financial motives.”51  This assertion by Bernard Wasserstein 
implies that the Western alliance faced not only a formidable, equally-equipped 
adversary, but the enemy’s ideology in communism characterized through autarchy, 
centralized power, and, according to Kennan’s telegram, a bi-polar environment without 
“peaceful coexistence”52 with liberal capitalism.  
 The Soviet expansionist policy shifted shape and form in order to achieve 
communist ideal proliferation. The Soviet regime would resolutely implement its seat in 
international forum organizations “where they see opportunity for extending Soviet 
power or of inhibiting or diluting [the] power of others.”53  Communism remained viable 
in any non-liberal/non-capitalist state, in which Western influence could be “inhibited, 
complicated, or weakened.”54 
 On August 14, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty became effective to 
“safeguard the freedoms and the civilization founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law.”55  Thomas explains: 
The early postwar period witnessed the emergence of a consensus in the 
West about the two central concepts that would guide future discussion 
about how to secure peace in Europe. The notions of self-help and mutual 
aid, enshrined in the Marshall Plan and the Vandenberg Resolution, paved 
the way for U.S. political and military commitment to defend Western 
Europe. The concepts also helped to establish an obligation on the part of 
the United States’ European allies to provide, with U.S. economic 
assistance, for the defense of Western Europe. The gradual coming 
together and intermingling of strategic, economic, geopolitical, and 
ideological considerations ultimately prompted policymakers on both 
sides of the Atlantic to consider the idea of mutual security guarantees. 
These guarantees took form in the North Atlantic Treaty, which, along 
with the Marshall Plan, was designed to thwart the Soviets, soften the 
appeal of communism, and hasten the recovery of Western Europe.56 
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The simplification of the Soviet threat57 did not translate into the simplification 
and justification of NATO granted the challenges of policy in collective defense. The 
refinement of the goals enshrined the raison d’être for the alliance and exemplified 
consensus, each member’s bureaucratic means, and, to a certain degree also guaranteed 
the longevity of the organization by harnessing Western ideals and concepts delineated in 
its charter. In retrospect, even the conception of North Atlantic Treaty displayed its 
institutionalization with measures of identity, bureaucratic, political bargaining, and 
burden-sharing conflict within the procession of its crises in their number. 
D. INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Samuel P. Huntington writes, “Institutionalization is the process by which 
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.”58  Furthermore, he stipulates 
four factors define the level of institutionalization for any political system:  “adaptability, 
complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures.”59  Through 
specific analysis of the history of NATO, this study will present cases of the evolving 
institutionalization through the organization’s growth in these four areas, relying 
specifically on the qualities that each factor represents. 
Adaptability represents a function of environmental challenge and age, and can be 
measured in length of existence, generational age, and functional terms.60  Huntington 
states,   “[C]hanges in environment may be produced by the organization itself—for 
instance, if it successfully completes the task it was originally created to accomplish.”61  
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This does not necessarily imply that the organization re-invents itself, but rather that it 
recognizes the changing environment around it, adapts to new challenges, and uses its 
experience (reacts with its time-proven procedures) to manipulate a stage that presents 
novel obstacles that require consideration.  
Generational age, as a function of chronology, infers the passing of the proverbial 
torch. Adaptable and reliable procedures guarantee the “peaceful succession ... of [one 
set] leaders by another.”62  Functional adaptability refers to a malleable mission feature 
of an organization, making more than just “an instrument to achieve certain purposes.”63 
Complexity enhances the lifespan of an organization through member 
empowerment.  “Complexity may involve both multiplication of organizational subunits, 
hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational 
subunits,”64 according to Huntington. Diversification in capabilities requires the 
diversification and increased utility of its individual members and subunits. Therefore, 
each member increases their vitality through their specific function, highlighting the 
critical nature of their respective subunit, and thus magnifying the functionality of the 
entire organization. This feature, according to Huntington, mitigates external threats and 
makes the organization less vulnerable.65 
Autonomy refers to “the extent to which political organizations and procedures 
exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior.”66  
Imperviousness to external and internal influences increases the integrity of the 
organization and its procedures. Organizations with high levels of autonomy display an 
impartial demeanor, and depend on the established procedures to achieve their prescribed 
goals. The author conveys that a political organization “articulates and aggregates the 
interests of several [...] groups.”67 
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Consensus defines another factor of institutionalization:  coherence. Samuel 
Huntington writes: 
The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly 
institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity, the less it is 
institutionalized. Some measure of consensus, of course, is a prerequisite 
for any social group. An effective organization requires, at a minimum, 
substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the 
procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries. 
The consensus must extend to those active in the system. Nonparticipants, 
or those only sporadically and marginally participant in the system, do not 
have to share the consensus and usually, in fact, do not share it to the same 
extent as the participants.68 
Coherence develops as a mindset that demands loyalty to the organization. 
Discipline69 within the organization’s procedural execution and upholding standards 
through admissions control imbue the members with a sense of unit purpose in the form 
of coherence. 
NATO exemplifies the qualities required for institutionalization through various 
political and military events throughout its lifespan. The four aforementioned factors 
were challenged, although not all once, through the beginning of the nuclear arms race, 
the Suez Canal incident, and the post-Cold War Yugoslavian conflict in Kosovo. Politics, 
and the incessant international struggle for power, are also present through internal and 
external channels, which manage to complicate the evolution of NATO through its 
organizational growth. Personalities rose from their diplomatic seats to influence the 
political proceedings and sway the strategic outcomes of these three NATO challenges 
that revealed peculiar crises for the organization. 
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1. Three Historical Crises 
a. NATO’s Nuclear Dilemma 
The nuclear arms race involved the technological procurement, testing, 
and strategic placement of viable nuclear vehicles that sent the Cold War into high gear, 
and which dangerously intensified the probability of mutual destruction. After the 
detonation of First Lightning in 1949 by the Soviets in Kazakhstan the Americans upped 
the ante by detonating its first thermonuclear device in the Bikini Atoll in March 1952.70  
The Soviets developed their own thermonuclear technology and conducted its own 
hydrogen bomb detonation in Kazakhstan in August 1953.71 
The United States actively sought the capability to place nuclear 
deliverables within missile operational reach. Sweden, although neutral throughout the 
Cold War had secret ties with NATO and boasted the largest air force behind the British 
Royal Air Force and “effectively provided air defence not only for Sweden but also for 
Norway and Denmark, both NATO members.”72  Sweden secretly agreed to make its 
national air bases available to NATO in the event of Soviet aggression on the condition to 
evacuate the Swedish government to Britain.73  Switzerland and Iceland also covertly 
joined the neutral group who supported NATO military bases circa 1951.74  Wallace 
Thies explains the socio-political statecraft: 
In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration was sensitive to the 
European’s fears and tried hard to assuage them. In September 1953, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested to President Eisenhower 
‘a spectacular effort to relax world tensions’ based on the creation of a 
‘broad zone of limited armament in Europe.’  Without such an effort, 
Dulles argued, American troops might have to leave, either because the 
Europeans would regard their bases ‘as lightning rods rather than 
umbrellas,’ or because the Europeans would reject an increasingly 
irritating American presence in their midst. In March 1954 Dulles worried 
that nuclear weapons had ‘tremendous repercussions’ and that a ‘wave of 
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hysteria’ was ‘driving our Allies away from us. They think we are getting 
ready for a war of this kind. We could survive, but some of them would be 
obliterated in a few minutes. It could lead to a policy of neutrality or 
appeasement.’  Eisenhower too acknowledged that ‘our allies are 
absolutely scared to death that we will use such weapons.’  Hence U.S. 
spokesmen responded to the Europeans’ fears by suggesting that the 
nuclear weapons on which NATO strategy rested could be made smaller, 
more precise, and more discriminating; alternatively, American officials 
suggested that NATO strategy would be revised to emphasize targets in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thereby sparing the NATO countries 
the horror of being a nuclear battlefield.75 
Wasserstein explains the new stalemate of nuclear international relations:  
“The Russo-American duopoly of nuclear power inaugurated a bipolar strategic 
environment in which the pretensions of Britain and France to great-power status were 
barely possible.”76  Edgar Furniss Jr. and Dorothy Pickles, two students of French 
politics, further explain that Europeans felt their control over national existence was 
exceedingly disappearing with “reliance on the NATO integrated force on American-
owned nuclear weapons.”77  Thies postulates, “During the Cold War, the European allies 
often resisted U.S. proposals to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces because doing so 
would in their view devalue the U.S. pledge to use nuclear weapons to repel an attack 
from the east...”78 This observation illustrates the common bargaining and burden-
shifting concept proposed by multiple authors as internal friction. 
The British and the French would continue pursuit of nuclear weapons 
development, despite continued NATO support.79  Britain detonated their first atomic 
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bomb off Western Australia on October 1952, followed by a thermonuclear device in 
May 1957. The British had garnered American recognition and a continental deterrent in 
national view.80  The successful launch of “Sputnik” in October 1957 exacerbated the 
nuclear arms race and led to the eventual “deployment of intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles (IRBMs) to Britain, Italy, and Turkey.”81 Wasserstein adds, “In July 1958 
Britain and the United States concluded an Atomic Energy Defence Agreement providing 
for a wide-ranging exchange of nuclear secrets and coordination for nuclear targeting.”82 
The NATO objective to contain the Soviet threat and the consensus over 
doctrinal employment of nuclear weapons provided the stage for one of the most 
influential Supreme Allied Commanders in the organization’s history. General Lauris 
Norstad personified the conscientious objector in the nuclear battlefield due to his 
preferred methodology on the employment of nuclear weapons.83  Jordan condenses the 
divergent and debated viewpoints between the United State’s new Commander-in-Chief, 
his administration, and General Norstad, SACEUR and USCINCEUR: 
[T]he mutuality of total nuclear destruction that had become the hallmark 
of the Cold War after Sputnik, the likelihood of nuclear war was the 
predominant concern of the New Frontier’s civilian planners, as it had 
been for their Republican predecessors. They were especially concerned 
about control over the overseas deployment of nuclear-tipped medium 
range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which were Norstad’s responsibility 
under both of his ‘hats’ as SACEUR and as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 
European Command (USCINCEUR). Norstad wanted multilateral NATO 
control, partly to provide a disincentive to any West German aspirations to 
‘go nuclear’. The Kennedy Administration wanted to ‘renationalize’ 
American control over these weapons.84 
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Under General Norstad’s leadership, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred 
operational control of all IRBMs in all NATO member-states (including those in U.S. 
soil) to SACEUR in both peace and war.85  Robert S. Jordan writes, “In practice, this 
meant that the weapons under Norstad would contribute directly to the overall deterrent 
capacity of both NATO and the U.S. (along with the smaller British strategic force).”86  
Norstad’s manipulation of his dual-hat responsibilities and loyalty to NATO and a 
multilateral nuclear front without unilateral influence shaped the nuclear policy during 
his tenure as SACEUR. 
The initial phase of the nuclear arms race through the 1950s represents the 
bureaucratic friction, political bargaining, and burden-sharing that characterize some of 
NATOs most notable crises. However, these characteristics are encapsulated in the 
developmental growth of NATO as an institution. Representation of coherent values as 
an anti-Communist entity for nuclear deterrence, display of institutional complexity 
through subunit establishment with its Science Committee,87 and practice of autonomy 
by synthesizing and executing the aggregate consensus for nuclear weapons proliferation 
and control contributed to the greater institutionalization of NATO during the 1950s 
nuclear armament. 
b. Breach of Contract 
The “temporary breach of the alliance”88 that the Suez Canal crisis 
instigated presented a subversive challenge with internal initiation that delegitimized 
NATO as a coherent organization. Gamal Abdul Nasser practiced manipulative politics 
by revealing an arms purchase agreement in September 1955 from Czechoslovakia 
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(under Soviet control) that produced an arms imbalance between Egypt and Israel.89  The 
British troops stationed at the Suez base, in accordance to an amended treaty signed in 
October 1954, evacuated Egyptian soil, while Nasser hosted Soviet Foreign Minister, 
Dmitry Shepilov.90  The perceived anti-Western pompous defiance prompted the 
American cancellation of financial aid for the Aswan High Dam construction, which 
resulted in the temporary nationalization91 of the Suez Canal by Nasser in late July 1956. 
Wasserstein writes, “Two thirds of western Europe’s oil supplies passed through the 
canal and Eden saw the Egyptian action as a threat of economic strangulation.”92  What 
ensued thereafter was covert tripartite planning by British, Israeli, and French forces. On 
October 29, the Israelis attacked Sinai, while the Anglo-French air force attacked Egypt 
two days later, in addition to paratroops in Port Said and Port Fuad on November 5,  
1956.93 
With vigorous opposition94 the Americans “demanded unequivocal 
Anglo-French acceptance of an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops,” which 
was soon executed by the three occupying forces by 22 December, and was replaced by a 
United Nations peacekeeping force. 95  Ryan C. Hendrickson writes, “While the political 
elite in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States all understood that each state 
had different reasons and interests for acting in the manner they did, the event 
demonstrated the true absence of consultation among the allies as well as the NAC’s 
impotence at the time, especially given that the allies had defined their national interests 
in such a dramatically different terms.”96 
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Thomas proposes that the difference in conception of NATO before and 
after the Suez Canal crisis was the emphasis on consultation.97 According to 
Hendrickson, Lord Ismay “sensing the growing political divide and the absence of 
consultation among the alliance’s major players, [he] encouraged discussions in the NAC 
that highlighted the need for improved means of consultation.”98  The report from the 
“Three Wise Men” highlighted the changing Soviet tactics to “ensnare newly 
independent countries” with the unchanged expansionist objectives.99  The open dialogue 
to continually reform NATO’s objectives was initiated by Lord Ismay, whose legacy for 
open communication resounded through the invigoration of “emphasized alliance 
cohesion” made possible through consultation.100  Thomas explains: 
The decision further to develop the Atlantic Community through increased 
consultation was motivated in part by the perception that changing soviet 
tactics required a corresponding change in NATO. Because the interests of 
NATO’s members were recognized as not being confined to one area, 
increased consultation also seemed to provide a solution to the problem of 
coordinating policy outside of area and simultaneously bolstering the 
cohesion of the Atlantic Community as expressed through NATO. 
Although there was widespread agreement that increased consultation 
would be inherently good, there remained no clear definition of what was 
meant by the development of an Atlantic Community—or in fact what 
exactly was meant by the concept itself. Nevertheless, the ambiguous 
concept of an Atlantic Community had broad political appeal and the 
community’s development was widely regarded as being the precondition 
to greater allied unity.101 
NATO confronted internal dissent, lack of cohesion, and evolving enemy 
tactics within ten years of its birth. Through its non-intervention, NATO retained 
autonomy, reformulated its mission objectives to enhance coherence, and adapted to the 
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changing time’s strategic demands in the midst of “rebellion” of some of its most 
powerful members who decided to “elevate national concerns over common 
objectives.”102 
c. Post–Cold War Dissent 
The deteriorating social and political conditions presented by the former 
Yugoslavian countries spiraled into war and atrocities,103 economic blockades set by the 
UN Security Council in 1992, and a confirmed massacre of more than 7,000 men.104  On 
the heels of Operation Deliberate Force and the subsequent Dayton Peace Accords, the 
1999 Kosovo crisis presented NATO with an ongoing problem in former Yugoslavia. 
Fighting intensified amidst fervent nationalistic views between the Yugoslav army and an 
extreme group of Kosovar Albanians,105 despite a United Nations’ Security Council 
Resolution that demanded a cease to violence.106 
NATO, under persistent pressure from the United States and Britain to act, 
faced the prospect of undermining UN Security Council legitimacy and popular criticism 
for its inaction in the face of human atrocities.107 After gaining “sufficient legal basis,”108 
NATO launched Operation Allied Force in March 1999 in order to “‘degrade’ the 
Yugoslav army’s capacity to assault Albanian civilians in Kosovo.”109  Wasserstein 
writes, “The NATO offensive eventually succeeded, however, in forcing the Serbs to 
remove their forces from the province,” eventually reaching a cease-fire agreement on 9 
June 1999.110 
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During the Yugoslavian crisis, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, 
garnered the respect and trust through “exceptional diplomatic skills.”111  During the UN 
Security Council’s substantial deliberation on the open defiance against Resolution 1199 
that lacked sufficient “military-authorization language” conducive to coercive action,112 
Javier Solana patiently orchestrated multilateral approval with enough European 
support113 and enough legal credibility to execute with political and humanistic 
legitimacy. Hendricks adds, “In the aftermath of Allied Force, it was widely felt at 
NATO headquarters that the campaign was a ‘NATO’ operation, and not strictly an 
‘American’ mission, a feeling that was partly due to Solana’s ability to listen to and 
convey all the allies’ concerns.”114 
NATO practiced tremendous autonomy, speaking in Huntington’s terms, 
throughout Operation Allied Force. Bureaucratic consensus and incredible diplomatic 
capability empowered NATO through the challenge offensive operations with a 
peacekeeping mission frame. NATO’s evolution from conflict to conflict accelerated its 
institutionalization and development as an organization. 
E. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE 
The crisis of institutionalization for NATO could easily be discarded as the 
organization’s growing pains. However, the inherent dilemmas in the nature of alliances 
among democracies and the problem of collective defense and security are the sources for 
the crisis itself for the Atlantic Community. Huntington writes: 
In a more complex society, however, community involves the relation of 
individual men or groups to something apart from themselves. The 
obligation is some principle, tradition, myth, purpose, or code of behavior 
that the persons and groups have in common. Consensus juris and utilitatis 
communio are two sides of political community. Yet there is also a third 
side. For attitudes must be reflected in behavior, and community involves 
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not just any ‘coming together’ but rather a regularized, stable, and 
sustained coming together. The coming together must, in short, be 
institutionalized. And the creation of political institutions involving and 
reflecting the moral consensus and mutual interest is, consequently, the 
third element.115 
Thomas contends that the diversity of conceptions reflects the organization’s 
malleability, and its changing conceptions are characteristics of its “flexibility, 
expressions of consensus within the alliance, and a key mechanism to alliance unity.”116  
NATO’s institutionalization and ability to transcend mission statements and generational 
axioms ultimately give it relevance and vitality. 
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III. MAINTAINING THE HIGHER MORAL GROUND 
The challenge to maintain relevance and vitality defies not only the Alliance’s 
institutional characteristics, but also its moral consciousness derived from Western ideals. 
These Western values, “democracy, free speech, human rights, rule of law, etc.,”117 
promoted and defended through NATO’s operations, stem as much from international 
demand as from internal requirement. The moral drive and ethical responses to a 
changing global scene require the Alliance to act in a manner that keeps it relevant and 
legitimate. 
A. MORAL IMPERATIVE FOR THE ALLIANCE 
NATO’s “institutional inertia”118 did not become ingrained without an organic 
moral impetus. Through its evolution, the Alliance has held a steadfast adhesion to the 
changing international norms and regulations that have shaped contemporary global 
relations. Thomas explains that “out of the conviction that the alliance had achieved a 
great moral victory in the Cold War, [...] it was therefore morally obliged to continue to 
serve the interests of peace and security.”119 The counterintuitive notion of an 
organization designed for collective defense regarding a moral obligation to defend its 
members’ vital national interests, and use military force as deemed acceptable by the 
global community, may be dispelled by analyzing NATO’s moral imperative. 
Immanuel Kant’s ethical philosophy of duty provides the framework for analysis 
that explains the Alliance’s motives for action (or inaction). According to Dr. Lawrence 
Hinman, professor of philosophy, and co-director and co-founder of the Center for Ethics 
and Technology, Kant’s ethics rest on “duty, universalizability, and respect.”120  Actions 
for the sake of duty, or in Hinman’s interpretation of Kant, “doing something because it 
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is the right thing to do,” represent “moral worth” and are “morally correct if its maxim 
can be willed as a universal law.”121  Hinman further explains, “A maxim for Kant is the 
subjective rule [...] in mind when performing an action.”122  Achieving universilizability 
depends on the condition of “whether people could consistently will that everyone adopt 
this maxim as a guide in their actions.”123  Hinman proceeds to explain Kant’s “basic 
moral principle:  the categorical imperative.”124  This executive concept provides an 
unconditional command that guides its users’ actions of genuine morality.125  Respect 
entails the treatment “of other people as ends in themselves—that we respect them as 
autonomous beings capable of reasoning and making choices based on the results of that 
reasoning.”126 
Considering the importance that Kant placed on the ethics of duty, viewing 
NATO’s actions with these concepts in mind may shed light on the organization’s 
embodiment as a guardian of the peace, and its moral imperative to protect its members 
and their interests. The Alliance’s continuing efforts to provide security, promote the 
Western ideals of democracy and the free market, and (as made evident in the last two 
decades) engagement in human rights advocacy, display an adaptable trend that conforms 
to the time’s arena of international relations. From its creation in 1949, NATO has 
applied military force through deterrence, peacekeeping/peacemaking, and nation-
building operations while adhering to the contemporary international norms. 
NATO exemplifies the duty principle by defending against expansionist 
governments and ideologies that threaten the security of its member states. On August of 
1949, U.S. Senator Vandenberg testified: 
My view is that this treaty is the most sensible, powerful, practical, and 
economic step the United States can now take in the realistic interest of its 
own security; in the effective discouragement of aggressive conquest 
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which would touch off world war three; in the stabilization of western 
Germany; and, as declared by its own preamble, in peacefully 
safeguarding the freedoms and the civilization founded on the principles 
of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.127 
When viewed as a universal decree, rather than a unilateral sentiment, the duty to 
safeguard against the expansionist governments with non-compromising ideologies 
(National Socialist Germany during the 1930s and 1940s) and Soviet Communist threat 
in the latter part of the twentieth century, in order to prevent mass atrocities, NATO’s 
moral imperative regarding duty maintains moral worth and correctness. 
The Alliance reflects universalizability in its actions by following the globally 
accepted norms set forth by post-1945 international law. NATO’s adherence to “Just War 
theory... customary international law... [and] the principles of proportionality and 
discrimination [,] internationally recognised as moral imperatives for all states [...] 
enshrined in covenants such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions,”128 satisfies the 
requirements of Kant’s moral ethics. The global acceptance of military power restraint, 
which minimizes human suffering and provides for the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants, is representative of the actions of NATO forces in the contemporary 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the ongoing operations in Afghanistan. ISAF’s 
evolving Tactical Directive, from former Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) General 
McChrystal to current COMISAF General Allen, succinctly and specifically dictates the 
importance of discrimination for non-combatants and the gravity that the civilian 
population holds for the success of combat operations, and the required measured means 
of force that each trooper must exercise in order to meet the condition of 
proportionality.129 
NATO displays Kantian respect toward the peoples of sovereign nation-states that 
provide legitimate governance for their citizens. The Alliance’s interventions on behalf of 
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humanitarian assistance and human rights advocacy, like the actions taken in Kosovo and 
Libya, present a current-day dilemma to maintain morality and legality, yet still illustrate 
the qualities of Kantian respect. Most recently, NATO deems this function its 
“responsibility to protect.”  Dr. Robert Jackson, professor of international relations at 
Boston University, explains: 
The responsibility to protect doctrine, in order to shield or rescue people 
from mass atrocity crimes calls for a departure from the basic legal norms 
of the United Nations pertaining to war, namely an expansion of the right 
of military intervention and a restriction of the corresponding right of non-
intervention. The doctrine proposes a right of war based on political 
legitimacy rather than international legality.130 
In order to compromise between the legality and morality, Dr. Helen Stacy, senior 
fellow at Stanford Law School summarizes, “Military interventions for humanitarian 
purposes arising from a state’s failure to protect its citizens from murderous unrest have 
invoked a moral language of international concern about the competence of domestic 
governments.”131  Dr. Stacy’s statement raises the point of a state’s ability to maintain a 
monopoly of violence and its ability to protect its citizens and their rights. Transgressions 
against human rights, perpetrated by non-state actors (highlighting the state’s inability to 
protect), or by the governing regime itself, demonstrate the state’s lack of legitimacy and 
therefore “surrender their legal prerogatives of sovereignty because of their failure 
towards its own citizens.”132  Through Kant’s perspective, respect for the nation-state’s 
sovereignty remains intact as long as individuals can think and act for themselves, 
retaining their individual rights and liberties. Infringement upon these rights and liberties 
represent a violation of Kant’s concept of humanity, and therefore constitute an amoral 
act. Through this calculus, NATO’s actions in Kosovo and Libya aligned with the moral 
imperative to protect a vulnerable population. 
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The Kantian ethics of duty illustrate the moral imperative for the Alliance, given 
contemporary context, the perceived threat, and ethical drive behind its actions. However, 
a criticism of Kant’s ethic of duty may arise by extrapolation, postulating that the 
necessity to protect vulnerable people prevalently exists around the world, for which the 
Alliance takes no action. Further inquiry may also propose that NATO’s operations 
reflect an imperative that does not set aside “preferences or potential gains to do the right 
thing.”133  How does NATO justify out-of-area actions in some places, but decide to 
evade its responsibility in others?  Kant’s description of the moral agent, and its 
qualitative “composition of reason and will”134 answers this moral interrogative. 
B. MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPULSE 
NATO engages in operations that positively influence the security and stability of 
its member states. The Alliance’s raison d’être maintains relevance through its active 
peacekeeping, security, and government-building operations. Execution of the 
organization’s mission statement depends on funds, materiel, and political will of its 
member nations, and their commitment to bolster security and their Western ideals. 
NATO’s actions define self-perpetuation versus self-service135—despite possible 
criticisms of expansion, the organization’s promotion of democracy spreads by virtue of 
prospective members’ requests, their candidacy, and ultimately, their alignment with 
standards of economic and political performance for membership. 
NATO’s Western ideals, which promote legitimate representative governments 
along with protection of human rights, become its stake. Limited by resource constraints, 
NATO must reason if capabilities to conduct operations to end human suffering are 
tenable by the organization, or whether a regional partner with similar capabilities may 
answer the call. With vested interest in maintaining stability through collective security, 
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the organization, as a rational moral agent, must intervene when its duty to protect its 
members and their interests are threatened by amoral conditions. 
1. Deferment of Action:  A Shared Morality 
Deferment of action occurred for the Alliance in the summer of 2003. Since 1998, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had endured internal strife that plagued the 
countryside with extremely violent results. According to United Nation’s Secretary 
General report on the Organization Mission in the DRC, “more than 3.5 million people 
are estimated to have died since 1998 as a direct or indirect result of the conflict.”136  In 
what was described as a “Central African web of wars,”137 the DRC hosted “nine 
governments, a dozen large guerrilla movements as well as a huge number of smaller 
armed groups and militias.”138  The eastern district of Ituri became the most contested 
area, for its rich natural resources, and the income generated through occupation and 
exploitation by the Rwandan and Ugandan war efforts.139  Intense rivalry and violent 
conflicts between the Hema and Lendu groups’ militias further complicate the chaotic 
environment. 
Ugandan forces retained control after assignment as the role of temporary 
peacekeeper after lengthy occupation. In September 2002, Uganda agreed to turn over 
control of the Ituri district to the unstable DRC government by the end of the year. 
Concurrently, the Kinshasa based government institutes the Ituri Pacification 
Commission (IPC) designed to supervise the Ugandan’s peacekeeping role, and the 
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eventual transfer of command. Due to bureaucratic complications, the DRC government 
“was unable to relieve the Ugandan army in Ituri.”140  
In the spring of 2003, the United Nations’ Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) provided security for the Interim Ituri 
Administration, under guidance from the IPC. In early May 2003, the Ugandan army 
withdrew from Bunia, Ituri, as coordinated through the Luanda government, after which 
immediate ethnic strife erupted. Without a peacekeeping force to regulate tribal power 
imbalance, the Lendu antagonized the Hema through “extreme violence (assassinations, 
ethnic cleansing, looting.)”141  The population executed a public demonstration against 
MONUC, who failed to provide security and protection with its 700 Uruguayan troops 
from the attacking Lendu. 
On 10 May, Secretary General Kofi Annan urged the UN member states to direct 
close attention and petitioned to address the violence taking place in DRC with a 
militarized force to minimize the hostilities temporarily. On May 12, the Union des 
Patriotes Congolaise (UPC), a northern Hema militia attacked and seized Bunia, targeting 
Lendu, and resulting in 430 deaths in two weeks.142  With the MONUC force under 
distress, and escalating destabilization, the Secretary General announced on May 13 that 
France agreed to participate in the intervention in Ituri.143 
With the United States occupied with conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO 
involvement in Africa seemed unlikely. For the European Union, this presented an 
unrivaled opportunity to demonstrate autonomy for a military crisis management 
operation on foreign soil. The UN Security Council risked losing legitimacy if another 
situation degraded to the depths of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide during the Bosnian 
conflict. The UN adopted Resolution 1484 (2003) on May 30, 2003, in which it 
“determined that the situation in the Ituri region and in Bunia in particular constitutes a 
threat to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the peace and 
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security in the Great Lakes Region.”144  In Luxembourg, six days later, the European 
Union adopts Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP,145 launching Operation Artemis in 
order to quell ethnic strife and mass atrocities in the DRC by bolstering security for 
MONUC. 
Operation Artemis marked the first autonomous European Security and Defense 
Policy military endeavor without the aid of NATO. Despite its non-reliance on the 
Alliance’s assets or military forces, the moral aim of the operation paralleled NATO’s 
advocacy for the protection against human rights violations, and the inherent 
destabilizing quality they bring on the state, as displayed in the UNSCR 1484.146  The 
shared moral alignment, the responsibility to protect, displayed by two coherent, 
collective security instruments reflects that transgressions against the “moral 
minimum”147 often requires military interdiction. Lawrence Hinman explains: 
Are nations that are not directly attacked ever justified in intervening 
militarily for humanitarian reasons to prevent the loss of civilian lives?  
Does this count as “just cause” for entering an armed conflict?  The 
answer that has emerged in the West is an affirmative one:  Sometimes 
third-party military intervention for humanitarian intervention may be 
justified to save the lives of innocent people. Typically, this is done under 
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Nations or NATO, in part to prevent it from degenerating into some kind 
of nationalistic campaign. Within this context, all the conditions for just 
war will continue to apply.148 
C. LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE UN’S ROLE IN NATO 
OPERATIONS 
The moral impulse, reliant on Western ideals, remains centrally imposed within 
NATO’s decision-making structure, due to its adherence to the organization’s mission 
statement. As the military embodiment of the West, it too relies on the global 
community’s approval for action, to a reasonable degree. The United Nations, working in 
concert with NATO, promotes peace and security as stated in their respective charters 
and mission statements. Stability, as prescribed in Article 55 of the UN Charter, is 
integral to international economic and social cooperation. 
The United Nations, acting as the “a forum committed to maintaining 
international peace and security,”149 formally issues decrees through Security Council 
Resolutions that urge the global community to action in order to reduce human suffering, 
and to maintain stability and security. By referencing its original charter and by 
promoting adherence to customary international law (i.e., 1954 Hague, and 1949/1977 
Geneva Conventions protocols),150 the UN has established itself as the critical institution 
that provides legitimacy through communal consensus to coercive military action. The 
UN’s Security Council Resolutions garner global moral appeal, and adherence to them by 
their designated multinational forces, or by other third parties (i.e., European Union, 
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African Union, NATO, etc.) depicts their legality of action. As a sanctioning body, the 
UN lends the notion of legitimacy, due to the organization’s promotion and adherence to 
international law.  
The bureaucratic process factors time into security operations based on the UN’s 
assessment of the situation, followed by security organization’s deliberation, and 
ultimately the deployment of its military forces. Consultation and consensus (at least by 
majority) remain staples of conscientious action by multilateral organizations. The EU’s 
intervention in face of deteriorating human rights conditions and an increasingly 
dangerous security situation for the domestic public and MONUC arrived fifteen days 
after the UN’s security council’s resolution.151 
The forward planning and enthusiasm to lead by France,152 as the framework 
nation of ESDP peace operations, counteracted the time-consuming,153 yet vital political 
process in the sanctioning and parent organizations, giving way to the rapid deployment 
and execution of the peace-making mission forces. As a temporal contrast, on May 12, 
2003, the UPC, a northern Hema militia attacked and seized Bunia, targeting Lendu and 
resulting in 430 deaths in two weeks. Despite the potentially destructive time lapse, 
“Operation Artemis proved to be a surgical and timely military intervention with political 
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importance for the EU as the first post-Iraq, multilateral, non-strategic EU 
intervention,”154 which remedied a morally reprehensible situation. 
1. NATO’s Historical Precedent to Align Morality and Legality:  
Operation Deliberate Force, 1994 
The oppression by military means in the Balkans struck a nerve of the NATO 
member states. Germany, with its anti-militaristic culture well formed in the decades 
following World War II and the Cold War, notably presented its aversion to human rights 
violations by the state and to the prospect of militarized enlargement within the European 
continent. Following the disintegration of the Yugoslav republics and their international 
declarations for independence, Serbian nationalist, militarized movements against 
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, received United 
Nation and European Union acclaim on their behalf by Germany.155 
Germany, with the moral imperative to prevent ethnic violence and militarized 
expansion in Europe, individually absorbed “hundreds of thousands...”156 Muslim 
refugees from Bosnia. Germany’s political rhetoric to quell ethnic violence in the early 
nineties reflected the moral imperative and ethical drive of NATO. The Alliance’s 
political discourse espoused by Secretary General Manfred Wörner, “who actively 
encouraged NATO intervention in the Balkans in numerous public appearances,”157 led 
to the eventual bombing of Bosnian Serb forces under the auspices of UNSCR 836 of 
mid-1993 under the subsequent NATO Secretary General Willy Claes’ direction of 
Operation Deliberate Force.158 German cultural aversion to militarism, and its 
requirement for international approval and accord would surface with their apprehensive 
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position159 under a similar morally reprehensible situation with an administratively 
restraining clause during the 1999 Kosovo conflict. 
2. A Gap Between Morality and Legality:  Operation Allied Force 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo during 1999 took form after the Dayton 
Accords of 1995, written as a peace agreement with diplomatic concessions by Serbs in 
Bosnia, had aftershock effects in neighboring Kosovo. The military defeat of the Serbs in 
Bosnia encouraged rebel Kosovar Albanians to “embark on a guerrilla campaign to oust 
the Serbs in that region.”160  The political situation in the UN that authorized a Security 
Council resolution for Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 did not match that of 1998. 
Hendrickson writes: 
Although most states were willing to condemn [President Slobodan] 
Milosevic’s repressive policies toward the Kosovo Albanians, the United 
Nations Security Council was divided on whether to authorize military 
action against Yugoslavia. The Russians and Chinese stood firm in their 
opposition to the use of force. Both states viewed Yugoslavia’s problems 
as sovereign in nature, and thus a question best left for the country to 
resolve internally.161  
The Western allies, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, sought 
approval for reprisals of military enforcement against Serbian atrocities in Kosovo that 
continued throughout the summer of 1998.162  Before the UN Security Council in 
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cease to violence, but “no formal approval for military strikes was given.”163  In the 
meantime, Slobodan Milosevic continued to back the Serbian persecution of Kosovar 
Albanians with “petulant obstinacy.”164 
What began with NATO’s threat of action through shows of force through by 
aircraft near Serbian borders and diplomatic threats to curb Milosevic’s human-rights 
transgressions, escalated to the Alliance’s first offensive campaign since its inception. 
According to Hendrickson, “The political result was that the UN Security Council 
demonstrated its weak resolve and in effect removed itself from the political debate.”165  
NATO, politically empowered by the United Nations’ lack of legal determination, 
embodied the “purposes and principles of the United Nations”166 to create stability and 
security, and more importantly, to take ethical action from the moral imperative to 
protect, under sufficient legal basis provided by Serbian noncompliance of UNSCR 1199 
with threat of military force. Wasserstein writes, “The declared object was to ‘degrade’ 
the Yugoslav army’s capacity to assault Albanian civilians in Kosovo... On 9 June 1999 a 
cease-fire was signed. A [NATO-led] international force, ‘KFOR’, took over as 
peacekeepers in Kosovo.”167 
Agreement amongst international relations experts exists when condemning 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force as illegal under international law, due to the lack of 
specification on the UNSCR. Cooper and Patterson cite Article 2, Section 4 of the UN 
Charter, in which it notes, “All members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state...”168  The superficial interpretation of this portion of the UN Charter supports the 
illegality of March 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo (as presented by Thomas Franck in a 
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Foreign Affairs Article in 1999, and Nebojsa Malic on Global Research in 2005.)169  
However, Cooper and Patterson conclude: 
From a Just War perspective, legitimate political authorities (states) acted 
on just cause (saving human life in an area where there was know 
genocide, and generally buttressing regional order) with right intentions 
(no intent to take over territory or resources). Every attempt was made by 
NATO leaders to act in a way proportionate to Serb aggression and that 
would preserve civilian lives (discrimination). Moreover, NATO and its 
political counterparts (the United States and the European Union) poured 
billions of dollars into post-conflict Kosovo to secure an enduring peace. 
In sum, the cause was just (jus ad bellum), the war was fought in a morally 
restrained manner (jus in bellum), and the West worked hard to create just 
and durable peace (jus post bellum). Judged from this perspective, the 
NATO intervention was moral.170 
3. Bridging the Morality and Legality Gap 
According to Jackson, proponents of the responsibility to protect doctrine favor 
political legitimacy over international legality. Assuming international law adapts to 
current world events in order to enforce morally acceptable norms, then “ad-hoc” 
amendments to the UN Charter based on humanitarian conditions171 represents an 
adaptive body of legal concepts. Stacy concludes that the Goldstone Commission’s 
findings on Kosovo requires that the moral imperative to protect must not be 
overshadowed by a myopic legalistic stance.172  Stacy states, “[H]uman rights atrocities 
provided a rationale for legitimacy of NATO intervention, if not the legality—legitimate 
because the intervention resolved a humanitarian crisis and had widespread support 
within the international community and civil society.”173 
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D. INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE GUARDIAN OF THE 
PEACE 
As a guardian of the peace, NATO compliments the shortfalls of the UN as a 
political institution capable of waging war.    According to James Turner Johnson”a 
fundamental limitation of the UN as an international organization came from defects in 
its putative claim to authority, when it came to conflict.”174 He argued that a lack of 
cohesion, sovereignty, and “an effective chain of command for any military force it might 
place in the midst of an ongoing conflict [would] prevent it from being an effective arm 
of international statecraft.”175 Ian Thomas however, viewed NATO as a renewing force 
that would properly allow the UN to function as initially envisioned.176  An excerpt of 
Thomas’ publication re-imagines NATO’s conceptions as:  a “foundation of security 
efforts of the free world,” peace promoter for global stability, arms control treaty 
enforcer, crisis preventer and manager, humanitarian assistance provider, 
peacekeeper/peacemaker for the UN.177 
As defender of the peace, the Alliance’s moral imperative may be interpreted as a 
global responsibility, however its allegiance is directed to the security of the trans-
Atlantic community. This fact does not limit NATO from operations outside its Atlantic 
reach or specifically on behalf of its member states, as represented by global response to 
humanitarian action of NATO Response Force’s operations during its mission for 
earthquake relief to Pakistan in October of 2005.178 With limited resources and 
concurrent operations, the Alliance also shares the moral responsibility the UN promotes 
to curtail human suffering with its regional partners (i.e., the European Union, the 
African Union). 
Evidence of the appeal from NATO’s promotion of Western values and moral 
suasion surfaced during the organization’s enlargement and the admission of Central and 
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Eastern European countries in the 1990s. Ronald Asmus writes: “Above all, it was about 
having a security anchor to help consolidate a pro-Western democratic orientation in 
what historically had been a rough geopolitical neighborhood.”179 Slovenia, 
representative of the political acclaim based on Western norms, declared independence 
from Yugoslavia in 1991,180 received NATO’s political support,181 and joined the 
Alliance in an eight-year accession process period yielding successful membership in 
2002.182 Wasserstein writes, “By 2005 Slovenia was ranked 26 on the UN Human 
Development Index, higher than any other ex-Communist state;” in 2011, Slovenia ranks 
21 of 187.183  As a defender of the peace, NATO delivers stability and peace through 
continued political and diplomatic support based on congruent moral foundations. 
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IV. NATO’S TRANSFORMATION:  SECURITY AND 
RELEVANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s malleable character allows it to meet 
the requirements posed by modern security challenges that threaten its multinational 
interests. As the strategic environment develops, the member-nations of the organization 
continually shape its goals, not only through rhetoric, but through tangible endeavors that 
overcome political, economic, and adversarial obstacles. As globalization increases, the 
interconnectedness between NATO members further cements itself under the umbrella of 
the organization’s ideals represented by its fundamental role:  “promoting democratic 
values”184 and “safeguarding the freedom and security of its member countries by 
political or military means.”185  Throughout the last six decades, and into the twenty-first 
century, NATO maintains its relevance through continuous transformation, meeting the 
security demands of its member-nations as it transcends its moniker of organization, and 
embodies the characteristics of an institution. 
A. CONTEMPORARY INSTITUTIONALIZATION  
NATO, through its history and current practices, embodies these qualities and 
continues to maintain its significance in the geo-strategic environment. In 2009, Allied 
Command Transformation’s Multiple Futures Project argued: 
The Alliance must be able to conduct a full range of operations and 
missions concurrently, ranging from collective defence to demanding 
stabilisation and reconstruction operations; and from security sector 
reform to large-scale high-intensity combat operations. Alliance forces 
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assuring access to and unfettered use of the sea, air, space, and cyberspace 
global commons. This unfettered access will be pivotal to the success of 
all Alliance operations.186 
The parallel of Huntington’s adaptability concept and the Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT) vision for NATO’s required trajectory resounds as loudly as the 
organization’s sexagenarian history.187  The organization’s ability to serve as a facilitator 
of West Germany’s de-occupation by Federal Republic forces, 188 as the “vanguard of the 
fight against communism,”189 and security guarantor and United Nations advocate during 
the Gulf War and Yugoslavian conflict demonstrate its adaptability.190  NATO flexed to 
meet the security demands that threatened stability, infringed on human rights and 
liberties, or challenged rule of law. The alliance met these demands through careful 
diversification throughout its history to facilitate political dialogue, promote Western 
ideals, and create mutually beneficial partnerships through its complex structure of 
offices and directorates that address current and future needs. 
The Alliance continually reflects institutional complexity and autonomy, given 
Huntington’s standards. NATO boasts a civilian and military structure that enhances 
collective security throughout the entire conflict spectrum, with diplomatic resources 
such as the Public Diplomacy Division and the forward-looking Emerging Security 
Challenges Division, to the Joint Warfare Centre and NATO Centers of Excellence that 
train International Security Assistance Force and NATO Response Force members. 
Regardless of individual member state political inclination or materiel contribution, the 
collective resources exist to promote codified joint execution procedures that meet, or 
exceed, the operational environment demands. Despite differences of political opinion, 
diplomatic consultation and discourse exemplifies the multinational character of NATO, 
satisfying its institutional requirement of autonomy. 
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The “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation” stipulates: 
The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European 
democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and 
able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and 
whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.191 
Uncompromising standards and accountability for collective benefit distinguish 
NATO as an organization with a solid defense mindset, which unifies its members under 
the risk of potentially costly consequences. These standards, as described in Slovenia’s 
eight-year accession period, represent the coherent quality within the Alliance. 
As the analysis proves apparent through historical and conceptual examples, 
NATO’s degree of institutionalization, along with the characteristics that define it as 
such, allows the organization to transcend periods of economic strife, political discord, 
and military action and in-action. As a geo-strategic institution, the flexibility promoted 
by its civilian and military resource structure make it more than a military alliance:  its 
role spreading democratic ideals, and creating security out of instability and threats 
through diplomatic, and military means when warranted, increase its relevance and 
intrinsic value. 
B. THREATS TO REGIONAL SECURITY 
1. Regional Instability 
NATO seeks to maintain regional security and stability, and the protection of its 
members’ freedoms and interests. In an increasingly globalized world,192 the instability 
created by social strife (denial or abuse of human rights) or economic distress produces 
far-reaching effects that infringe on the “common values of individual liberty, 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law,” that NATO aims to preserve. 
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Scott Jasper, the Chief Operating Officer at the Center for Civil-Military 
Relations aboard the Naval Post-Graduate School, presents regional instability by 
characterizing failed or failing states as a source for concern. Jasper explains that “as a 
result of political disorder, resource corruption, ideologically centered mismanagement, 
economic collapse and ineffective social infrastructure,”193 a failed state produces 
instability. The author also correlates a weak state’s inability to enforce institutions and 
laws to the viability of transnational organized crime and violent piracy.194 
Allied Command Transformation deems it necessary to act upon actions 
undertaken by state, and non-state actors alike, that may de-stabilize regional security, or 
threaten a NATO member’s interests. The ACT’s Multiple Futures Project (MFP) states, 
“The Alliance will need to respond to a wide variety of security challenges that are 
mainly a consequence of destabilisation and the absence of governance.”195  The MFP 
adds that the security challenges will stem from “unbridled extremism, uncontrolled and 
illegal migration, and friction caused by resource scarcity.”196 
 NATO’s Heads of State and Government in Lisbon recognize the threat of 
instability out of NATO’s regional constraints, which may also foster “extremism, 
terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and 
people.”197  The Strategic Concept for Defense and Security goes further and highlights 
the vulnerability of international trade routes that may threaten the energy security and 
prosperity of member nations.198  The economic arena’s vulnerability comes into focus as 
the implication of organized criminal activity, and its detrimental social, and economic 
effects surface to create instability. Criminal activity destabilizes not only public safety, 
but also the legitimacy of the local government (which may fall prey to corruptive 
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practices). Loss of legitimacy may erode credibility in the domestic regime’s capability to 
maintain governance, creating a loss of sovereignty. 
Intra-national and international corruption delegitimizes governments, empowers 
criminal organizations and individuals, and threatens the stability of global order by 
skewing economic investment into the world market.199 Economic destabilization in 
nascent capitalist countries200 with fledgling economies present optimal opportunities for 
predatory and nefarious activity that can become breeding grounds for corrupt practices; 
this in turn could result in inordinate wealth misallocation that produces global market 
discrepancies. Ensuring international trade assets and governments with whom NATO 
members conduct business maintain comparable economic ethical trade standards, 
transparency, and focus on transnational crime, remains high on the organization’s 
priorities through bilateral work with the UN.201 
2. Ideology 
The most influential threat, because of its destructive power, lies in the multi-
cultural arena. Francis Fukuyama writes, “Nationalism has been a threat to liberalism 
historically in Germany, and continues to be one in isolated parts of ‘post-historical’ 
Europe like Northern Ireland... Certainly a great deal of the world’s ethnic and nationalist 
tension can be explained in terms of peoples who are forced to live in unrepresentative 
political systems that they have not chosen.”202  John J. Mearsheimer writes: 
[H]ypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation-states are both 
inferior and threatening, is perhaps the single greatest domestic threat to 
peace, although it is still not a leading force in world politics. 
Hypernationalism arose in the past among European states because most 
                                                 
199 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment” (UNODC, 2010). 
200  Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, “The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers,” 
Sage, September 1993, http://pas.sagepub.com (accessed March 26, 2010).  
201  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC Eecutive Director meets European Union 
officils and attends NATO briefing on mission to Brussels, March 2011, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/eds-corner/March2011/unodc-executive-director-meets-european-union-
officials-and-attends-nato-briefing-on-mission-to-brussels.html (accessed March 5, 2012).  
202 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” in Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on the 
Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York, NY: Pearson Education, 2003), 13. 
 52
of them were nation-states—states composed mainly of people from a 
single ethnic group—that existed in an anarchic world, under constant 
threat from other states. In such a system, people who love their own 
nation can easily come to be contemptuous of the nationalities inhabiting 
opposing states. The problem is worsened when domestic elites demonize 
a rival nation to drum up support for national-security policy203 
Fervent nationalism, with its highly politicized quality and mass appeal, can 
misinform, distort, and manipulate ideology to meet its political end through violent 
means. September 11, 2001, represented the start of another protracted engagement with 
global repercussions. Osama Bin Laden, a radical Islamic militant,204 claimed 
responsibility, justifying the actions as a threat to the beliefs of “more than a billion 
Muslim followers around the world.”205  Although not a conventional threat of nation-
state versus nation-state, the antagonistic view that killed over 3,000 innocent civilians 
materializes from a skewed and manipulated ideology. Harnessing a political agenda 
through emotionally charged concepts like religion and nationalism promotes the rise of 
non-state actors and groups that employ irregular warfare tactics to achieve their goals. 
3. Irregular Warfare and the Fourth Generation War 
Colin S. Gray differentiates between regular and irregular warfare, noting that the 
former involves warfare between regular armed forces sponsored by the state to meet 
political objectives; meanwhile, the latter involves the regime’s “coercive armed 
forces”206 versus “irregular armed forces of non-state political entities.”207 Its 
“asymmetric”208 quality, given the imbalance of strategic and tactical advantages and 
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disadvantages,209 presents the irregular warfare practitioner with the need to resort to 
guerrilla tactics and terrorism to achieve its strategic goals. 
John Shy and Thomas W. Collier categorize irregular warfare as a necessity of 
revolutionary war. Revolutionary warfare, according to these authors, “refers to the 
seizure of political power by the use of armed force.”210  Irregular warfare, as grouped by 
Shy and Collier, encompasses the type of combat operations that subcategorizes the 
means of a revolutionary war as “political mobilization of people, legal political action, 
strikes, agitation, and terrorism,”211 (also including guerrilla tactics). 
Although scholarly discord amongst the aforementioned authors exists regarding 
terminology categorization,212 the overarching concept of disparity between the regulars 
and irregulars with respect with capabilities, training, and equipment remains constant. 
However, these authors conceptually agree on the high degree of political thrust that 
propels irregular warfare. Gray contends that irregular warfare weighs “the relative 
political strength of the belligerents,”213 and Shy and Collier rely on the visited definition 
of revolutionary war and its use of unconventional tactics to achieve a seizure of power. 
Carl Schmitt, a legal and political theorist of the early twentieth century, presents 
the concept of the political in a reductionist approach that ultimately, and definitively 
distinguishes friend from enemy.214 Schmitt further explains that the friend/foe 
distinction “denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation.”215 The 
psychology of the political, therefore, allows “[e]ach participant [...] a position to judge 
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whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be 
repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own form of existence.”216  This engenders 
the viability of violent conflict between the regulars and irregulars through an 
antagonistic indoctrination promoted by the leaders that set political, strategic, and 
tactical guidelines. 
The antithesis of being, represented by Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political, 
characterizes an irreconcilable difference that, if allowed to exist, detrimentally affects 
each opposing groups’ raison d’être. From an ideological standpoint, the political aspect 
of irregular warfare exemplifies the inability to coexist, exemplified by the Cold War’s 
capitalist and communist players.217  Theoretically, this political force supports Samuel 
P. Huntington’s claim of a state’s strife that occurs at the “fault lines[,] between 
civilizations”218 that transcend nation-state borders and ideological boundaries. 
Following Huntington’s theory that maintains “nation states as the most powerful actors 
in world affairs,”219 the implication of weaker nations and civilizations rising and 
creating conflict through fundamental,220 irreconcilable and non-negotiable 
differences,221 presents the opportunity for the employment of irregular warfare. With the 
opposing groups’ political strength on the balance, the strategic and tactical problems that 
arise, and each groups’ capability to adjust in an ever-changing environment, decide the 
victor in this type of warfare. 
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According to Jasper, the employment of “asymmetric methods to achieve political 
outcomes...” gives way to “Fourth generation” warfare.222  Jasper explains how this latest 
iteration of warfare223 aims to “collapse the enemy from within by destroying public 
support and political will.”224 Colin Gray presents his precept that the “strategic 
currency” in the “true battle space of irregular warfare ... is the will of the civilian 
population.”225  Gray further explains that “modern irregular warfare is all about the 
allegiance, or tolerance, of the civilian population,” in which “the minds of the people are 
the zone of strategic and political decision.”226  The allegiance of the populace becomes 
the critical factor for regular, or irregular, progress, as it holds the power to perpetuate 
their cause. Jasper and Gray’s agreement on the importance and vitality of populace is 
recognized by the Bi-Strategic Commands at SACEUR and SACT assessment of Hybrid 
Threats as “one of the Alliance’s target Centres of Gravity (CoG).”227  The importance 
and support of the local populace foments legitimacy, and ultimately denies the enemy its 
“indistinguishable”228 characteristic that provides them freedom of movement that makes 
their guerrilla, or terrorist, tactics so effective. 
C. NATO’S RESPONSE TO THE FOURTH GENERATION WAR 
The present security situation presents NATO with a threat of collective security 
and economic interests based on ideology, and the task to defuse another possible 
catastrophic event. A hybrid threat, as defined by the NATO Bi-Strategic Command 
comprised of SACEUR, and Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation (SACT), has 
“the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means 
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adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.”229 An enemy that presents global-strategic 
security threats to the Alliance characterized by an indistinguishable quality, coercive 
approach, and aims to delegitimize and destroy political will proves to be a formidable 
adversary. However, as indiscernible and nebulous as the adversary may be, it provides 
NATO with a unifying focus that hastens concepts and prototypes, and the dissemination 
of tactics, techniques, and procedures that minimize the asymmetric gap. 
1. Transformative Vision 
NATO has proven efficient at re-inventing itself to through rhetoric and 
conceptualization,230 according Ian Thomas, to meet the demands of its current 
environment. Thomas also explains how Under Secretary of State George Ball compared 
the organization to living organisms “show[ing] a capability of adjustment to change... 
[NATO] has undergone a profound transformation into a major element in the Atlantic 
Partnership.”231 
Jasper develops this transformation concept, which replaced the term of 
“revolution in military affairs.”232  Jasper defines transformation as: 
... a continuous process that shapes the nature of military competition and 
cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, 
streamlined organizational structures, innovative processes, and adaptive 
personnel developments that exploit national advantages and protect 
against asymmetric vulnerabilities. By definition, transformation has no 
end state.233 
Defense transformation for NATO means higher diversification in the conflict 
spectrum, whilst maintaining core competency in regular warfare. 
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With the understanding that the fourth generation warfare environment will likely 
develop in an urban setting,234 in which local populace will be the strategic currency,235 a 
notable requirement arises. Recognized throughout the majority of the NATO 
transformation literature, the need to fill a cultural knowledge gap remains evident. The 
Bi-SC Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept highlights the need to “understand a 
wide range of ethnic groups and cultures, systems and structures” so as to not alienate 
local populations.236  James A. Winnefeld recognizes the value of Purdue University’s 
Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS) during training, to qualify 
and quantify the effects of joint operations on local population attitudes.237  Dr. Thomas 
G. Mahnken, a scholar in the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Paul H. 
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, proposes 
the need for culturally adept military personnel. Mahnken states, “They should have an 
understanding of foreign culture and language and be able to work closely with allies and 
friends.”238 
The interoperability and compatibility promoted by joint training and exercises 
will increase with repetition and experience.239  The NATO Response Force, which 
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alliance’s deliberate commitment to improve its collective military capabilities, as well as 
an endorsement of transformation in general.”240 Paul Giarra shares a brief description of 
the NRF: 
The NRF s a rapidly deployable multinational unit made up of land, air, 
maritime and special forces components. Numbering some 24,000 troops 
when it reaches full operating capability in October 2006, it will be able to 
start to deploy after five days’ notice and sustain itself for operations 
lasting 30 days or longer if resupplied.241 
NATO’s systematic standby system for NRF responsibility reflects communal 
burden-sharing, and a transformative trajectory. NATO directives individually prescribe 
that all technological and training advantages be prioritized for NRF usage and 
experimentation.242  The NRF, if not eclipsed by the predominance of ISAF Afghanistan, 
becomes critical in the NATO’s transformative mission due to the inherent benefits for 
concepts, development, and experimentation; not to mention the effects in optimizing 
joint training doctrine.  
D. NATO’S TRANSFORMATION 
Cultural differences must not only be recognized, but also taken into 
consideration as part of this nation’s strategic framework. Divergence between our 
nation’s and other non-Western nations’ ideology on religion, politics, civil rights and 
liberties can create obstacles for progress, or undue friction. Special consideration to 
culture, its degree of importance, and its heavy integration, from the strategic to the 
tactical level, should be instituted to produce beneficial results and trends that enhance 
our legitimacy. Cultural grievances triggered by misunderstandings or lack of cultural 
knowledge may generate fervent nationalism,243 which may threaten stability and our 
regional security. 
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Providing collective security within a multinational construct creates political 
friction due to the communal burden of this monumental task. In economically austere 
times, NATO’s Secretary General Rasmussen’s call for a “smart defense” approach may 
provide the most palatable solution, given the tightening of defense budgets.244  The 
greater multi-national cooperation, beneficial political resolve, and open dialogue with 
emerging powers to maintain security and stability resonate from the Secretary General’s 
proposal like the consensus, consultation, and multi-lateral understanding which have 
kept NATO on line despite internal discord. 
Despite challenging threats and an evolving security environment, NATO has 
managed to administer internal politics, adapt to tangible security threats, and has 
emerged as more than a military alliance. Historically, NATO’s evolution from conflict 
to conflict accelerated its institutionalization and development as an organization. 
NATO’s ability to transform and shape-shift to counter modern challenges are a 
testament to its adaptability. 
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V. A FORCE FOR THE FUTURE 
Garnering political and legal legitimacy in order to meet the requirements of jus 
ad bellum is as challenging as maintaining the moral superiority during the conduct of 
war, and furthermore, during the actions post-bellum. The representation of Western 
ideals, and by default the representation of the trans-Atlantic community through NATO 
operations, gains a higher degree of difficulty due to the transparency of actions 
supported by the Alliance through real-time media and non-governmental organization 
coverage of combat and rebuilding operations.   
The humanistic approach to adequately protect civilians, discern combatants from 
non-combatants, and deftly determine whether to apply military force due to life-saving 
necessity are the hallmarks of the NATO’s Rules of Engagement. The adaptability to the 
law of armed conflict comes not out of convenience, but through tactical experience and 
educated recommendations, which reflects the evolving nature of combat. In order to 
meet the protective requirement of military leaders to defend non-combatants and their 
troops alike, in combat scenarios of irregular warfare with increasing difficulty where the 
enemy’s center of gravity rests on its ability to seamlessly blend into the civilian 
population, political leaders and diplomats of the Alliance support and endorse directives 
which foment the tactical latitude to meet this need. NATO’s COMISAF Tactical 
Directive provide the morally correct guidance that delineates its members’ duty and 
tempers the use the military force against an enemy that subscribes to no sort of moral 
restraint in the conduct of war. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the challenge of 
irregular warfare depicts the major ethical factor that distinguishes ISAF troops as 
morally superior from anti-Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 
forces:  adherence to internationally accepted means and modes of violence during the 
conduct of war.  
After diminishing the violence and restoring governance, the Alliance faces and 
demonstrates the responsibility to rebuild. Timothy Garton-Ash lists Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan (to name a few mentioned in this study) as twenty-first century international 
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occupation “state-building” enterprises.245 The author urges the trans-Atlantic 
community to maintain resolve, “and not sullenly withdraw, leaving the job half 
done.”246  Garton-Ash contends, “It is in failed states, such as Afghanistan, that militant 
extremists and international terrorists find a congenial home.”247 
The responsibility to rebuild receives a moral analysis by Alexandra Gheciu and 
Jennifer Welsh in 2009. The two authors critique the “Kantian-inspired arguments about 
international democracy promotion”248 and the establishment of an ethical imperative to 
rebuild states out of a “special responsibility to rebuild after the implementation of force, 
a duty to project democracy as a cosmopolitan value, a rendering of the duties of 
statesmanship, and lastly through a desire to restore self-determination.”249  Gheciu and 
Welsh write: 
Following the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the 
problem of unstable (particularly postcontlict) states acquired new 
urgency, as such states came to be seen as likely hosts for terrorist 
movements and, as such, the source of a significant unconventional threat 
to international security. It thereby became especially important for 
international actors to contribute to postconflict reconstruction in order to 
minimize the potential breeding grounds for terrorism. In particular, from 
this perspective international actors engaged in reconstruction need to 
develop more effective ways to support progressive, peaceful groups in 
target societies, and to work with the local population to identify and 
defeat extremist factions. 
In addition to critically assessing the political focus of statesmen on 
reconstruction with self-interest in mind (versus duty) to ensure security, the authors 
highlight the lack of consideration given to local populations and the possibility that the 
promotion of democracy may “destroy arrangements that might promote stability, or that 
might be perceived as legitimate by the local population.”250 
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To meet this demand in Afghanistan, ISAF member nations contribute culturally 
trained forces into military transition teams, composed primarily of Afghan nationals, in 
order to train, educate, and create a self-sustaining, indigenous security force. 
Furthermore, the requirement to respect and foment unity within the local population and 
their social networks receives pedagogic attention at the highest levels of the Alliance’s 
military structure. In concert with UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA), 
NATO continues to provide security, rebuild national infrastructure, and distributes funds 
necessary to establish a legitimate regime for GIRoA. Under a legal and legitimate 
operation with over a decade of combat and reconstruction operations, ISAF collaterally 
“identifies reconstruction needs, such as rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities, 
restoring water supplies providing support for other civil-military relations.”251 
NATO’s ability to continually adapt to contemporary challenges will allow it to 
remain at the forefront of the regional security and collective defense arena. By operating 
with just cause and ethical resolve behind its actions, the Alliance’s endeavors will 
remain morally justifiable. NATO’s adaptive nature will enhance its vitality, and its 
moral imperative will keep NATO relevant by providing the impulse for action to meet 
its global security demands. 
Garnering universal support for security operation from the United Nations has 
proven difficult due to national individualistic political agendas. However, as a 
sanctioning body, the UN’s shortcomings as the global conduit for international accord 
and legal consent shift the responsibility for action to regional security actors. NATO’s 
operations must display political legitimacy through sufficient legal basis, so as not to 
discredit its credibility. 
Training for the tactical units and the lowest echelon level civilian counterparts 
within the Alliance must continually address operational shortcomings, in order to meet 
the demands of NATO strategy. Clear articulation of the Alliance’s mission, its moral 
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imperative and just cause, will empower its troops to ethically carry out their mission. 
National militaries must ensure proper cultural training for their troops, so that they may 
contribute to the Alliance’s mission effectively on foreign soil. 
Imparting cultural knowledge will increase NATO troops’ and members’ 
effectiveness by enhancing environmental understanding and awareness, thereby 
producing troops that may effectively operate within a foreign environment. Navigating 
through unfamiliar cultural networks and structures and overcoming language barriers 
have become priorities as our world increasingly hosts fourth generation warfare 
scenarios. NATO troops must learn to effectively communicate with the civilian 
population of the conflict host-nation in order to harness their allegiance and political 
support. 
By clearly articulating the organization’s political intent and identifying the 
leadership’s desired end-state, the Alliance’s operational- and tactical-level members may 
understand how to creatively employ their available means within the applicable 
constraints to meet the mission’s demands. Understanding the political environment at 
the lower levels may eventually lead to viewing rules of engagement as empowering 
legalese that protects non-combatants and troops alike. Training on the laws of war 
requires an emphasis on moral responsibility to protect human life and should present 
ROE as the legal representation of guidelines to achieve their political objective. 
NATO must continue to abide by the law of war, deliver coercive military force 
proportionally and with discrimination, and take the proper steps to win the peace after 
winning the war. Ethical restraint while providing military support and moral 
accountability during security and state-building operations must remain the hallmarks of 
action while promoting Western ideals. The Alliance’s steadfast determination to 
promote rule of law, and democratic and free-market economic practices during the state-
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